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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Eugene Estep appeals from his judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of rape. Estep claims the court denied him
his constitutional right to represent himself and that the court abused its
sentencing discretion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Estep befriended C.C. when they rode the Citylink bus together. (Trial Tr.,
p.117, Ls.17-23.) At the time, C.C. was 18-years-old and Estep was 52-yearsold.

(R., pp.26, 59; Trial Tr. 1, p.117, Ls.10-11; 12/19/2012 PSI, pp.1-2.)

One

afternoon in August 2010, Estep and C.C. went to Post Falls where Estep
purchased "Four Loco malt beverages for them to drink." (R., p.26.) C.C drank
two of them "and became intoxicated and sick."

(R., p.26.)

After that, Estep

drove C.C. to his home where C.C. "remembered being sick," "taking a bath,"
and "waking up in a bed, naked" with Estep "having sexual intercourse with her."
(R., p.26.)

C.C. "was scared and tried to pretend like she was sleeping" but

heard Estep telling her "he loved her and that she was supposed to be with him."
(R., p.26.)

After Estep raped C.C., she "acted like she needed to use the

bathroom" and "put on her shorts" and a grey sweatshirt Estep gave her to wear.

There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript
containing the trial and sentencing will be referred to as "Trial Tr." The transcript
that includes numerous hearings between February 23, 2011, and April 3, 2012,
will be referred to as "Tr." All other transcript references will be by date of the
hearing cited.
1
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room and fled. (R., p.26.) As C

C

was

down the

lied up along side her in his vehicle" and "tried
into the car"; C.C. refused and Estep "threw a shirt
p.26; Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.2-7.)

payphone where she called 911.

bra out the window."

C.C. continued running until she found a
(R., p.26; Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.22-24, p.135,

Ls.8-9.)
When law enforcement arrived, she was upset and having difficulty
breathing.

(R., pp.25-26.)

C.C. has asthma and was having a "panic attack."

(R., pp.25-26; Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.6-7.) C.C. was transported to the hospital for
an evaluation, including the collection of evidence using a rape kit. (R., p.26.)
The state charged Estep with rape and dispensing alcohol to a minor. 2
(R., pp.348-349.)

Before the case even proceeded to a preliminary hearing,

Estep was complaining about his appointed counsel and sought a continuance to
obtain different counsel. (R., p.59.) Estep's request was granted. (R., p.59.) At
the next scheduled hearing date, defense counsel said she intended to file a
request for an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-210.

(R., p.61.)

The court

continued the matter again and counsel filed the motion for a competency
evaluation the next day.

(R., pp.61-63.)

entered an Order for Evaluation.

On September 20, 2010, the court

(R., pp.64-65.)

Estep objected to the

evaluation. (R., pp.70, 72.)

2

The state also initially charged Estep with enticement of a child under the age
of 16, but that charge was later dismissed pursuant to the state's motion because
the victim in this case was 18-years-old at the time of the rape. (R., pp.105-106.)

2

On
to

1

2010, based on the evaluator's finding that Estep was

roci~ea," could not "assist his counsel" and "lack[ed]

capacity to

make informed decisions about treatment," the court entered an Order for
Involuntary Commitment. (R., pp.74-75.) Approximately two months later, while
still committed, Estep submitted a request indicating his intent to obtain new
counsel. (R., p.82.) Two days later, the court held a "preliminary hearing status
conference" at which time counsel advised the court that Estep wanted to hire an
attorney. (R., p.83.) The court continued the preliminary hearing to give Estep
time to do so. (R., p.83.) That same day, the court entered an order terminating
Estep's commitment as recommended by Dr. Nels Sather. (R., pp.84-85.)
At the next hearing date, on December 22, 2010, Estep requested another
continuance due to his preference to hire private counsel; the court granted the
request and reset the matter to January 12, 2011.

(R., p.87.) Estep was still

unable to retain private counsel by January 12, 2011. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.1617.)

However, at that hearing, Estep reiterated that he did not want to be

represented by the public defender. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.2, Ls.21-22.) The court
advised Estep that although he had the right to appointed counsel, he did not
have the right to choose who that attorney would be. (1/12/2011 Tr., p.3, L.4 p.4, L.9.) The court held a hearing the following day by which time Estep was
assigned a new public defender but still indicated he wanted to hire private
counsel.

(R., p.89.)

The court declined another continuance and the case

proceeded to preliminary hearing.

(R., pp.89-100.)

3

The court found probable

cause to bind Estep over and advised him he could hire private counsel at any
time. (R., p.100.)
Through various "kites" that were submitted to the court, Estep continued
to express his dissatisfaction with being represented by the public defender's
office and his desire to hire private counsel. (R., pp.109-110, 140-141.) Estep
reiterated these sentiments during court hearings in front of Judge Benjamin
Simpson.

(R., pp.111-112, 140-141.)

Simpson on June 9, 2011, Estep asked:

At a hearing held in front of Judge
"Probably no way you would let me

defend myself, is there? Only a fool defends himself, and I am pretty stupid."
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-15.)

Estep also complained that appointed counsel had not

done anything and after inquiring of Estep regarding his ability to represent
himself, the court expressed concern about "18-210 issues," and discussed with
Estep his efforts to hire an attorney. (See generally Tr., pp.25-32.) The court
asked the public defender to facilitate Estep's efforts to hire an attorney and
continued the matter again. (Tr., p.32, L.18 - p.33, L.B.) Judge Simpson also
ordered another competency evaluation. (R., pp.142-143.)
At the next hearing, the public defender provided the court with a letter
from attorney John Rose, whom Estep wanted to represent him.

(R., pp.144-

145.) Mr. Rose noted that Estep wanted assistance "identify[ing] the assets in
his conservatorship estate and to defend his criminal charges." (R., p.145.) Mr.
Rose revealed, however, that Estep did "not have the money to retain [Mr.
Rose's] services" but he "would be willing to accept an appointment to represent
Mr. Estep in the guardianship matter and/or criminal defense." (R., p.145.) The

4

the competency evaluation was completed

noted

it

any further determinations regarding

(Tr.,

Ls.5-7.)
Despite the pending evaluation, Estep continued to submit kites asking for
the removal of the public defender and to proceed pro se. (R., pp.167, 174.) At
the next hearing, the court addressed Estep's requests, noting it was still waiting
for the evaluator's competency report.

(Tr., p.43, L.22 - p.45, L.5.)

Estep

acknowledged as much but advised the court that Mr. Rose agreed to represent
him for "$75 an hour" and asked that Mr. Rose be appointed to "help [him] with
[his] prose" but not as "attorney of record." (Tr., p.45, Ls.6-18.) The matter was
continued pending the results of the second evaluation. (R., p.175.)
At the next hearing, a status conference held on November 18, 2011, at
which Estep was represented by a conflict public defender, counsel advised the
court that he just received the competency report and it indicated Estep was
competent to proceed. (Tr., p.55, L.5-14.) At that time, although Judge Simpson
had not yet seen the report (and, in fact, defense counsel objected to it being
disclosed to the court), he stated he had "no intention of letting [Estep] represent
himself." (Tr., p.55, Ls.10-25.)
The next hearing, held February 2, 2012, was for a motion to compel
production of the evaluation.

(R., p.198.)

At that hearing, Judge Simpson

expressed concern over Estep's mental health and stated he wanted a
Designated Examination conducted within 24 hours. (Tr., p.68, Ls.6-9.) Estep
protested and his attorney advised the court that Estep was competent and did
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not want any treatment.

(Tr., p.68, Ls.14-15, p.69, Ls.11, 17-23.) The court

nevertheless entered an Order for Designated Examination. (R., p.200.)
On February 28, 2012, Judge Simpson entered an order finding Estep
competent to proceed. (R., p.209.) Because of health issues related to Estep's
refusal to eat, on April 3, 2012, the court released Estep on his own
recognizance. (See generally Tr., pp.83-85; Tr., p.90, Ls.10-13 (counsel notes
Estep had not "eaten solid food since around Thanksgiving"); R., pp.225-226,
230-233.) On that same date, the court advised Estep:
Mr. Estep, with respect to your motion to represent yourself,
we have already done that twice. I have already told you no twice.
I am telling you no again. You have an attorney. You are going to
continue to have an attorney unless you get to a much better
condition where I think you can communicate and represent
yourself. So your motion for prose representation is denied.
(Tr., p.112, Ls.2-9.)
After being released, Estep appeared at hearings with counsel without
requesting the ability to proceed prose, although he did submit a prose pleading
for investigative funds.

(R., p.239 (5/24/2012 hearing, Estep appears with

counsel and no request to proceed pro se noted in court minutes); p.245
(7/27/2012 hearing, Estep appears with counsel and no request to proceed pro
se noted in court minutes); pp.249-252 (prose motion).)

On November 14, 2012, an Order of Voluntary Disqualification was
entered disqualifying Judge Simpson from presiding over Estep's case, which
was the result of Estep making a death threat against him.

(R., pp.258, 262-

263.) Judge John T. Mitchell replaced Judge Simpson. (See R., p.264.)
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November 21,

after Judge Simpson disqualified

2, one

and just 12 days before trial was

to commence, Estep, through

counsel, filed a motion to disqualify "all judges chambered in Kootenai County"
because of the alleged death threat against Judge Simpson. (R., p.17 (9/7/2012
entry, noting trial set for 12/3/2012), pp.262-263.) Counsel also filed a motion
seeking leave to withdraw or to allow Estep to proceed pro se with stand-by
counsel.

(R., pp.260-261.) The motion indicated Estep "repeatedly informed"

counsel "of his desire to fire [him] and have counsel removed from the case."
(R., p.260.) The motion further states Estep "has clearly demanded his right to

represent himself." (R., p.261.) The court held a hearing on both motions. The
court first denied Estep's request to disqualify all judges chambered in Kootenai
County. (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.6-7; R., pp.266-271.)
With respect to the motion to allow counsel to withdraw, counsel advised
the court:
Mr. Estep has exercised his right to proceed pro se. He's
informed me this morning that he does not want to proceed pro
se; instead, he just wants a different attorney. As the Court can
see, he has - has or will or may file some bar complaints against
me, and so that doesn't cause me any stress if the Court were to
allow me to withdraw. At this point Mr. Estep has been very clear,
he's been very adamant for the last month and a half that he wants
me off this case.
Since his arrest with the alleged threat to Judge Simpson's
life, since his arrest that has become even more of [sic] vociferous.
He does not want me as his attorney at this trial, so, Your Honor,
I'd ask the Court grant me leave to withdraw and assign a
different conflict public defender.
(Trial Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.12, L.6 (emphasis added).)
The court denied the request. (Trial Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.4; R., p.271.)
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On December 7, 2012, three days before trial, Estep filed a kite asking to
"bring a motion to pro-se if not total then for cross exanation of any prosection
withiness."

(R., p.404 (verbatim, capitalization altered, underlining original).)

Estep did not raise the issue when he next appeared in court, which was the
morning of trial, and nor did the court independently take action on this request
other than to forward a copy to defense counsel and to the state the day before
trial. (R., p.404.)
The case finally proceeded to trial on December 10, 2012, more than two
years after Estep raped C.C. At his request, Estep was tried in absentia and the
jury found Estep guilty of both charged offenses.
p.43, L.20; R., p.401.)

(See Trial Tr., p.27, L.13 -

The court imposed a 180-day jail sentence for the

dispensing alcohol charge, with 180 days credit for time served, and a fixed life
sentence for the rape charge. (R., pp.430-432; Trial Tr., p.445, Ls.13-17, p.446,
Ls.21-23.) Estep filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.439-441.)
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ISSUES
issues on

as:

1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Estep's rights under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I,
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code §§ 19-106
and 19-857, when it refused to permit him to represent
himself at trial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
fixed life sentence following Mr. Estep's conviction for nonforcible rape?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Estep failed
representation?

to establish

any violation

of his right to self-

2.
Has Estep failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

9

ARGUMENT
I.

Estep Has Failed To Show That His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation
Was Violated
Introduction
Estep argues he was denied his right to self-representation "when the
district court first denied and then ignored his requests to proceed pro se."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Estep asserts a denial of this right by both Judge
Simpson and Judge Mitchell. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Both arguments fail.
Any rulings by Judge Simpson are irrelevant to whether Estep was denied his
right to represent himself at trial because Judge Simpson did not consider the
two pertinent requests regarding Estep's representation at trial - the motion Estep
filed on November 21, 2012, or the kite he submitted on December 7, 2012.
Estep has failed to show Judge Mitchell violated his right to self-representation
with respect to the November 21, 2012 motion because Estep did not seek to
represent himself at that time; he sought the appointment of new counsel. Estep
has also failed to establish a denial of the right to self-representation as a result
of the court's failure to act on the December 7, 2012 kite because Estep never
pursued that request in court.

Estep's claims that he was denied his right to

represent himself therefore fail.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will defer to findings of fact supported by substantial

evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional requirements to the

10

found. State v. Jenninas, 122 Idaho

p

1,

1342, 1

(Ct

1

Estep Has Failed To Show Any Relevant Denial Of His Right To SelfRepresentation

C.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 13, of the Idaho Constitution both provide the right to self-representation.
State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 339, 256 P.3d 735, 747 (2011). However, "the right
of self-representation is not absolute." Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171
(2008).

In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that, even assuming a criminal

defendant "has sufficient mental competence to stand trial . . . and that the
defendant insists on representing himself during that trial," "the Constitution
permits a State to limit [a] defendant's self-representation right by insisting upon
representation by counsel at trial-on the ground that the defendant lacks mental
capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented."

kt at

this

American

conclusion,

the

Supreme

Court

quoted

the

174. In reaching
Psychiatric

Association's position that "[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention
and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common
symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant's ability to play
the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can
play the lesser role of represented defendant."

kt

The Court further reasoned:

... a right of self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of
a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense
without the assistance of counsel. To the contrary, given that
defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well
result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to
prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant's
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lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, selfrepresentation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic
of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.
As Justice Brennan put it, the Constitution would protect none of us
if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes
that the Constitution itself prescribes.
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear
fair to all who observe them.
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Court concluded "the Constitution permits judges to take realistic
account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a
defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to
do so." Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-178. Estep has failed to show his right to selfrepresentation was violated.
Estep first complains that Judge Simpson violated his right to selfrepresentation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.)

This Court should decline to

consider any of Estep's arguments in this regard because Judge Simpson did not
ultimately determine the manner in which Estep would be represented at trial.
Although Judge Simpson undoubtedly addressed the issue at various points in
the two years Estep's case was pending, and last told Estep he would not allow
him to represent himself "unless" Estep could "get to a much better condition
where [he could] communicate and represent [himself]," the final determination

prior to trial was made by Judge Mitchell.

As such, this Court should only

consider Judge Mitchell's determinations on this issue. 3

To the extent Estep is asserting some deprivation of his right to represent
himself pre-trial, it is unclear how a deprivation of any such right would entitle him
to the relief he requests, i.e., vacating his convictions. Nevertheless, even
3

12

respect to Judge Mitchell's decisions,
on

21, 2012

acknowledges that at the

filed by counsel,

clarified that

Estep did not want to proceed pro se, but instead wanted a different attorney.
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Estep did not dispute counsel's clarification, nor is it

reasonable or appropriate to presume that counsel was not accurately
communicating Estep's wishes, especially in light of the fact that counsel filed the
motion in the first instance.

(See generally Trial Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.13, L.6.)

Although Estep now implies this may have been improper, noting he was not
asked any questions by the district court prior to the clarification by counsel, he
offers no argument or authority to support any claim that the court's denial of the
November 21, 2012 motion was erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Instead,
Estep asserts, "Regardless of whether Mr. Estep's attorney could have waived
the issue of self-representation at the hearing on defense counsel's motion, three
days before trial started, Mr. Estep filed a kite ... in which he again sought to
exercise his right to self-representation."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Thus, any

claim in relation to the ruling on the November 21, 2012 motion is waived. 4 State
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on

assuming the Court considers Judge Simpson's pre-trial determinations relating
to Estep's requests regarding the status of his representation (which were
frequently requests for different counsel, rather than to proceed pro se), the
record supports Judge Simpson's decision to not allow Estep to represent
himself because the information available to Judge Simpson supports his
conclusion that Estep was not competent to do so under Edwards.
4 Moreover, the district court was well within its discretion to deny Estep's request
for substitute counsel. State v. DeWitt, 153 Idaho 658, 661, 289 P.3d 60, 63 (Ct.
App. 2012) ("The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. The right to
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice.").

13

by propositions of

authority, or

considered.
7, 2012

Specifically addressing the

complains

"district court made no attempt to address this request with [him]" even though it
"forwarded copies to defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney the day
before trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Estep, however, ignores that he had the
opportunity to raise this issue before trial commenced on December 10, 2012.
On the morning of trial, the court took up pre-trial matters at 8:33 a.m., which
included whether restraints should be used and Estep's refusal to wear civilian
clothes - choosing instead to appear in his orange jail clothing. (Trial Tr., p.15,
L.2 - p.19, L.23.) Following the discussion of Estep's attire, Estep decided he
wanted to be tried in absentia. (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.13-22.) When asked for his
reasons, defense counsel told the court Estep wanted to personally "address the
Court on that issue." (Trial Tr., p.29, Ls.12-14.) Estep did so, stating:

... I believe absentia would be best for me. I'll trust [defense
counsel's] abilities to defend me.
We've had some
disagreements, and I feel like that if I'm present, I may bring those
disagreements up. Uh, I haven't slept properly in the jail, although
today I am very clear. I haven't ate properly on a religious fast, and
I'm not sure how that's gonna affect me later on, but I am currently
in a clear state of mind. I believe that you and this court has the
ability to handle my fate properly, and me being there I only think
could cause me to at some point be agitated. I can't always be in
control of my behavior.
(Trial Tr., p.29, L 18 - p.30, L.4 (emphasis added).)
Estep also declined defense counsel's suggestion that Estep be brought
to court each morning to ensure his continued desire not to attend his own trial;
stating, "I don't see a purpose in that. Anything I could be -- I could be sent any
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paperwork I need to be sent to the jail. We can talk on the phone. If I get an
epiphany, I will call you." (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.8-12.) The court told Estep that if he
changed his mind at any point, it would "resume the trial with [him] present" and
would "do that in an instant." (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.41, L.2.) Estep stated he
understood and told Judge Mitchell, "I understand, and to make you even more
comfortable, I think I've written you enough stuff in the jail; you know if I have any
issues, I will write you." (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.14-16.) Judge Mitchell acknowledged
that but cautioned Estep against communicating via kite if he changed his mind
about participating in his trial due to the possibility that the kite would not reach
the court in a timely fashion; the judge told Estep to instead communicate with jail
staff and he would "make sure that they pass that information along to [him]
immediately." (Trial Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42, L.8.) Estep said he understood. (Trial
Tr., p.42, Ls. 7-9.)
In light of the foregoing, Estep's complaint that Judge Mitchell "made no
attempt to address" his December 7, 2012 kite is not well-founded. Estep had
the opportunity to present his request to the court before trial started and rather
than doing so, he expressed his trust in counsel's ability to represent him at trial;
indeed, to represent him even in his absence. Estep cannot seriously contend
that he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on this issue. (Appellant's
Brief, p.14.)

Estep's claim that Judge Mitchell violated his right to self-

representation fails.
Finally, Estep argues that even if he did not suffer a Sixth Amendment
violation, he was deprived of his rights under the Idaho Constitution and Idaho
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Code§§ 19-106 and 19-857. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-19.) According to Estep,
Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, "confer" a right to self-representation "in a
manner that suggests a more robust right than is guaranteed under the Sixth
Amendment" (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) This assertion appears to be based on
two grounds.

First, Estep notes that LC. § 19-857, which allows a criminal

defendant to waive the right to counsel, requires the court to consider "such
factors as the person's age, education and familiarity with the English language
and the complexity of the crime involved," in determining whether the defendant,
in waiving the right, "has acted with full awareness of his rights and of the
consequences of a waiver." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) Second, Estep cites
both I.C. § 19-106, and State v. Athens, 36 Idaho 224, 210 P.133 (1922), which
recognize that a criminal defendant can either appear with counsel or defend
himself. (Appellant's Brief, pp .18-19.) The state fails to understand how either
statute, or the opinion in Athens, reflect a "more robust right than is guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment"
While it is true that the Idaho Supreme Court has said that it will not
"blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when
in the process of interpreting their own constitutions," (Appellant's Brief, p.18

(quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6 (1985)), the Court has also
stated:

"Generally, the federal framework is appropriate for analysis of state

constitutional questions unless the state constitution, the unique nature of the
state, or Idaho precedent clearly indicates that a different analysis applies." CDA
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 383, 299 P.3d 186, 190
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(2013).

"Thus, this Court will consider federal rules and methodology when

interpreting parts of the Idaho Constitution that have an analogous federal
provision." CDA Dairy Queen, 154 Idaho at 383, 299 P.3d at 190.
Estep has cited no case in which the appellate courts of this state have
departed from United States Supreme Court precedent with respect to the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation, much less any principled reason for
doing so.

In fact, if anything, Idaho's courts have adhered to Supreme Court

jurisprudence on this point. See,~' Folk, 151 Idaho at 339, 256 P.3d at 747;
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 778-779, 229 P.3d 379, 383-384 (Ct. App.
2009) (citing Edwards, supra). 5

Estep's claim that he has a greater right to

represent himself under the Idaho Constitution should be rejected.

5

Ironically, Estep cites Hawkins, "applying Edwards," in discussing competency
standards (Appellant's Brief, p.12), but in arguing that the Idaho Constitution
provides greater protections, he states "[t]he fact the United States Supreme
Court has ... diminished the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, does
not mean that the Idaho Supreme Court should do likewise" (Appellant's Brief,
p.18). It is unclear whether he reconciles this discrepancy because Hawkins is a
Court of Appeals case. Regardless, as already noted, Estep has not cited any
Idaho case departing from the Supreme Court on the right to self-representation.
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11.
Estep Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing A Fixed Life Sentence
Introduction
Estep "asserts that, in light of his brain injury and the nature of this
offense, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a fixed life
sentence following his conviction for non-forcible rape." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.)
The record and the law support the sentence imposed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." _kl

C.

Estep Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise

of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of
discretion.

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011);

State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted).
A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessarf to achieve the
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primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kl at 875-76,

253 P.3d at 312-13; State

v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001).

Rape is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of fixed life
imprisonment.

I.C. § 18-6104. Because the fixed life sentence imposed upon

Estep's conviction is within the statutory limit, Estep bears the burden on appeal
of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604,
768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989). On appeal, the question before this Court is not
what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district court
abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217,
226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.
App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 ("[W]here
reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court will be
respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with its
own."). Estep has not demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in
the district court's determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not
only warranted, but also necessary, under the facts of this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:

"To impose a fixed life sentence

requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross,
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (Internal quotations and
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emphasis omitted). This "high degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where
"the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe measure of
retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative
potential that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting
society." State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 388, 179 P.3d 346 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis
added).
Estep first asserts "[p]erhaps the most important factor demonstrating the
unreasonableness of the fixed life sentence ... is the nature of the offense."
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Specifically, Estep finds it significant that he "used no
force or threat of force to commit the rape" but he "instead took advantage of the
victim's voluntarily intoxicated state to engage in non-consensual sexual
intercourse with her."

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

The law makes no distinction

between "forcible" or "non-forcible" rape for purposes of the maximum sentence
authorized.

Beyond that, to suggest, as Estep's argument does, that C.C. felt

any less fear or suffered any less harm than she would have if Estep had instead
threatened her in order to rape her belittles the fear C.C. did, in fact, experience
as a result of Estep's actions.
In a similar vein, Estep asserts he is "not someone with a history of
violence."

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

This contention ignores that Estep is,

however, someone with a history of being a sexual predator, which was a
significant factor in the court's sentencing determination.

In explaining the

reason for imposing a life sentence, the district court reviewed Estep's history in
this regard:
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Let's go back to the July 28th, 2006, event, and I'll explain
why my decision is a life sentence. Again, you put
hands
down the pants and fondled the vagina and breasts
your twe!veyear-old mentally disabled victim. You lured her into your home
every day for a week, and on July 28 th , 2006, you pied guilty to
touching her breasts and vagina with your hands.
October 24th, 2006, a complaint was issued by the Kootenai
County Prosecuting Attorney charging you with lewd conduct with a
child under age eighteen . . .. When you got wind that you were
being charged with that offense, you fled to Canada. You were
gone for a year ....

January 11th, 2008, you entered your guilty plea to the
reduced charged of felony injury to child. . . . A full disclosure
polygraph was performed and a psychosexual evaluation was
performed. I'll talk more about those later.
(Trial Tr., p.446, L.25 - p.448, L.16.)
Discussing the polygraph, the court noted that when asked how many
victims he had, Estep "estimated [he] had about twenty." (Trial Tr., p.450, Ls.1618.) The court continued:
You then proceeded to list in chronological order -- I counted
29 victims . . . Of those 29 victims, 21 involved fact situations
extremely similar to what you did to C.C. on August 4th, 2010. You
did say that to him. I don't care if you remember. I am finding as a
fact that you said those things . . and you said those things prior to
raping C.C. on August 4th, 2010.
The reason for my life sentence is, either way, you can't be
placed on probation. If you were truthful in what you said regarding
those 29 prior victims, then you're a serial rapist and you need to
go to prison. If you're just making this stuff up, you're making up
stuff that in 21 of the 29 cases is the exact blueprint you followed
two years later, August 4th, 2010, with C.C. in the present case. I
don't see a different outcome for you. It would not make any
difference whether you were telling [the polygrapher] the truth in
2008 or fabricating it, because even if you're fabricating it, you are
playing this event that's about to happen to C.C. on August 4th,
2010, over and over again in your very sick mind.
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The second offense, 28 months after you're placed on
probation for the reduced offense of injury to child, was to C.C. I've
already talked about you are the only person that made her
unconscious. In your statements to Detective Martin you blamed
that on your buddy Mike, but that wasn't C.C.'s testimony. You're
the one that provided her with the alcohol. You're the one that
didn't have any alcohol, and I know exactly why. You wanted to
follow through with your business plan that you'd filed with [the
polygrapher] two years earlier.
(Trial Tr., p.450, L.18 - p.451, L.25.)
The court later stated: "I do not feel that rehabilitation is even remotely
possible." (Trial Tr., p.460, L.25 - p.461, L.1.) This factor, in conjunction with the
threat Estep presents to the community, especially young and adolescent
females supports imposition of a fixed life sentence. Estep has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Estep's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014.

uty Attorney General
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